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Abstract
When Japan National Railways (JNR) was privatized into six regionally monopolistic railway
corporations in 1987, there emerged exceptional areas where the industrial structure of railway
transportation happened to be duopolistic due to an operational reason. Leveraging on this natural
experimental setting arising from the privatization of JNR, we estimate the impact of market
competition on the service quality i.e., speed and scheduling of a high-speed rail (HSR) run by an
oligopolistic service provider. The paper shows that the change in time costs is significantly lower
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for the shorter-distance markets where the competition is presumably more intensive.
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1 Introduction
Japan National Railways (JNR) –a state-owned public corporation that provided railway services
nation-wide– was dismantled into six regional railway companies in 1987. As a result of dismantling
of JNR, each of six railway companies is in charge of both the Shinkansen high-speed rail (HSR) and a
conventional rail in its respective region. There emerged, however, a limited number of areas with an
increased level of market competition, where HSR and conventional rail are operated by two separate
companies due to an operational reason. By utilizing this exogenous variation in the competitive
pressure from a conventional rail, this paper measures the impact of market competition on supply
behaviors of an oligopolistic HSR transport service provider. Specifically, we obtain from published
timetables the change in time costs namely the in-vehicle time and schedule delay of traveling on a
HSR before and after the JNR’s privatization. The paper has found that the change in users’ time
costs of using HSR are significantly higher in the area where railway service is monopolized relative
to the area where it is duopolized. We have also found that such eﬀect is larger for the trip distance
of 30-40km reflecting that the conventional rail acts as a closer competitor to HSR in shorter-distance
markets.
As its start of privatization process in 1987, JNR was geographically divided into six Japan Railway
(JR) companies. In principle, each of them is in charge of both HSR and parallelly running conventional
rail in the designated region. Exception to this principle is greater-Tokyo and greater-Osaka areas,
where they are operated by two separate JR companies. While JR Central operates the HSR all
the way from Tokyo to Osaka, conventional rail services are provided by JR East and JR West in the
vicinity of Tokyo and Osaka terminals. This created a diﬀerence in the intensity of market competition
where HSR and conventional rail services are either monopolized or duopolized after the privatization.
This conforms the design of the current research that measures the diﬀerence in the impact of duopoly
and monopoly before and after the privatization of railway services.
Shinkansen, as known as a ”bullet train”, started running in 1964. The zero series, a bullet-shaped
train car designed exclusively for Shinkansen ran on the newly developed track of 552.6-km length
between Tokyo and Osaka at the maximum operational speed of 210 km/h. It connected these two
largest cities of Japan in 3 hours and 10 minutes, which is less than a half of the fastest conventional
express trains’ at that time. As a result, there are two parallel rail tracks that connect major cities
between Tokyo and Osaka, namely, Shinkansen HSR and the conventional rail. Table 1 summarizes
the diﬀerences between these two modes of rail transport along this largest trunk route in Japan.
On April 1st, 1987, Japan National Railways (JNR) was divided geographically into six Japan
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Table 1: Characteristics of Shinkansen and conventional rail in 1965.
Shinkansen (HSR) Conventional Rail
Maximum speed 210 km/h1 110 km/h
Average speed2 171.8 km/h1 86.0 km/h
Minimum travel time2 3 hrs 10 mins1 6 hrs 30 mins
Gauge 1,435 mm 1,067 mm
Minimum curve radius2 2,500 m 400 m
Total length of tunnels2 68.0 km 27.0 km
Road crossings none about 1,100
Length of a train car 25.0 m 20.5 m
Width of a train car 3.38 m 2.95 m
Notes: 1These values are after the one-year initial inauguration period of Shinkansen HSR. 2These
values are between Tokyo and Osaka. Data source is Japan National Railways.
Table 2: Operators of railways between Tokyo and Osaka after dissolution of JNR.
Segment
Type of Service Tokyo-Atami Atami-Maibara Maibara-Osaka
High Speed Rail JR Central JR Central JR Central
Conventional Rail JR East JR Central JR West
Distance 104.6 km 341.3 km 106.7 km
Railway (JR) companies as shown in Figure 1.1 In principle, each of six JR companies provides both
the HSR and conventional rail services in the designated region.2 For example, JR East is in charge of
the area east of Atami city including greater Tokyo, and JR West is covering western part of mainland
Japan beyond Maibara city including greater Osaka. One of the exceptions to this principle is HSR
service between Tokyo and Osaka. While the provision of conventional rail services between Tokyo and
Osaka is divided into three companies at Atami and Maibara as mentioned above, HSR is operated
throughout by one single company, namely JR Central for practicality of operation. This situation is
summarized in Table 2.
When these six JR companies were founded, they were regarded as special corporations because
JNR Settlement Corporation –a public entity to settle the huge debt that JNR left– still owned the
entire share. JNR was badly in red. Its huge debt was not only due to investment, but rather by
cumulated operational losses over the years. JR companies took over about a third of JNR’s debt of
37.1 trillion yen back then, while the two thirds were supposed to be repaid by selling their shares in
the stock market later on. Though they were publicly owned, the new JR companies were expected
1They are JR Hokkaido, JR East, JR Central, JR West, JR Shikoku, and JR Kyushu. Another company in charge
of cargo, Japan Freight Railway Company, was also established.
2There is no HSR in JR Shikoku area.
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Figure 1. Geographical locations of JR companies and Shinkansen route between Tokyo and Osaka.
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to make as much profit as possible and pay back the debt as soon as possible. JR companies who
inherited a large, if not excessive, number of employees and unprofitable routes in rural areas, had to
improve their operational eﬃciency greatly in order to be profitable.
Three JR companies in mainland Japan, namely JR East, JR Central, and JR West did well by
exploiting the market power as regional monopoly. Price back then was set by the government based
on their cost with a fixed markup. Their high cost implied high price set by the government. This high
price enabled them to cash in their market power as they improved their operational eﬃciency. JR
East was listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1993 and JR West was in 1996, followed by JR Central
in 1997. By April 2006, all three companies’ stocks were sold entirely to private share holders.
Until they were excluded in 2001, these three JR companies were regulated by JR Corporation
Law.3 Under the law, price change required government’s approval. Indeed, price has not been changed
since 1987 until January 1996, when three JR companies outside of mainland Japan for the first time
requested system-wide price change and were granted approval. However, JR East, JR Central, and JR
West did not change their prices even then, and in fact not ever since the start of JNR’s privatization
process until now.4 We therefore measure the treatment eﬀect of the market competition on time
costs in the current paper. We focus on two time points when three mainland JR companies started
and completed public listing, namely 1996 and 2006. These two years are compared to 1986, the year
before the start of their privatization process.
Market competition is the most classic, if not the most important issue in Economics (cf. Cham-
berlin, 1933). In fact, there exists a vast theoretical literature on the role and impact of market
competition (e.g. Abbott, 1955). Theory tells that competition increases quality when prices are reg-
ulated. However, when firms set both price and quality, the impact of competition is ambiguous (e.g.,
Spence, 1975). Some models predict competition increases quality (Tirole, 1988; and Pepall et al.,
2005).5 In contrast to the theoretical literature, empirical literature on causal inference of competition
impact is limited.6 Masta (2011) examines the eﬀect of competition in the US supermarket industry
utilizing Walmart store openings as an exogenous shock to local markets. Busso and Galiani (2015),
3Other three, JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, and JR Kyushu are still currently regulated under the law.
4This is mostly due to political pressure that privatization cannot be associated with price increase. However, ever
since JR companies are established Japanese economy has been facing continuous deflation, that eﬀectively increased the
relative price. There is common political sentiment, or phobia, among formerly state-owned and then privatized regional
monopolies such as highway, electricity, and railway companies, regarding discussing about prices, especially when they
are being profitable.
5See appendix for the theoretical illustration in our context.
6There exist several papers attempting to identify the impact of market competition. For instance, Domberger and
Sherr (1989) is on the market for conveyancing legal services in England and Wales; Hoxby (2000) on school education in
the US; Mazzeo (2003) on the US airline industry; Amiti & Khandelwal (2013) on the manufacturing industry. l Some of
them exploit quasi/natural experimental settings to isolate the impact of competitive environment, such as the timing of
a policy implementation and geographical features. However, none of these studies controls unit-intrinsic heterogeneity
mainly because they rely on cross-sectional variations in the degree of competition.
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which is the first and sole experimental study in the literature, explores the impact of competition
among grocery stores on prices and quality of goods in the Dominican Republic, randomizing the entry
of new grocery stores in a conditional cash transfer program. Background of this limited empirical
literature is a lack of “good” exogenous variation, while experiment is almost impossible. This is largely
due to the fact that the intensity of market competition is typically time-invariant, and therefore only
cross-sectional data are available. As a result, in many studies heterogeneity between units in treat-
ment and control is seriously large, which leads to confounding say, by self selection. Reverse causality
is also likely to bias the result if a company with high product quality kicks out others and thus reduces
competition. This paper adds to a few empirical studies that measures the impact of competition by
using exogenous variation arising from a natural experimental setting along with unit-of-observation
fixed eﬀects.
In the next section we explain our data and empirical strategy in detail. Section 3 presents the
results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Sample Design and Identification Strategy
As can be seen in Table 1, those segments, Tokyo-Atami and Maibara-Osaka are duopolized after
privatization, while Atami-Maibara segment remained as monopoly. Our unit of analysis is a directional
pair of Shinkansen stations, one being the origin and another being the destination, which we refer to
as an OD pair. We group OD pairs into two; one with those OD pairs such that the entire journey is
contained in the duopolized area, and another with those such that both their origin and destination
stations are in the monopolized area. We refer to the former as the treatment group and the latter as
the control group. At the time of privatization, there were two intermediate stations between Tokyo
and Atami; six were between Atami and Maibara; and there was one between Maibara and Osaka.7
Therefore the number of directional OD pairs is 18 in the treatment area and it is 56 in the control
area.
Our outcome variable is users’ time cost. User’s time cost of a trip between an OD pair is a sum of
in-vehicle time and schedule delay. Schedule delay is the time diﬀerence between the train arrival and
the passenger’s target arrival time. In-vehicle time and schedule delay on three time points before and
after the privatization of JNR corporation in 1987 is collected, namely for years 1986, 1996 and 2006
from published timetables. Base year in our data is 1986, the year before the start of privatization
process. Treatment year is as mentioned above, either 1996 or 2006. Duopoly dummy takes the value
7Shinkansen stations then are, from east to west, Tokyo, Yokohama, Odawara, Atami, Mishima, Shizuoka, Hama-
matsu, Toyohashi, Nagoya, Gifu, Maibara, Kyoto, and Osaka.
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Table 3: Key characteristics of OD pairs.
Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
1. Distance (km)
in monopoly area 155.8 92.4 16.1 341.3
in duopoly area 64.7 29.9 20.7 106.7
2. Values in 1986:
In-vehicle time 54.1 36.1 10.0 140.2
Schedule delay 17.2 2.92 9.1 25.7
Travel Time 71.3 37.1 25.3 160.1
3. Values in 1996:
In-vehicle time 58.8 42.1 8.0 158.9
Schedule delay 17.1 2.42 9.0 23.2
Travel Time 75.9 43.0 23.5 180.2
4. Values in 2006:
In-vehicle time 54.8 40.0 7.1 151.3
Schedule delay 16.6 3.82 5.7 27.7
Travel Time 71.5 41.3 20.3 170.8
Notes: The number of OD pairs is 56 in monopoly area and 18 in duopoly area. The number of
observations is 74 for all years. Distances are in kilometers. In-vehicle time, schedule delay, and
travel time are in minutes.
of one in the treatment year if the OD pair is in the duopolized area, and zero otherwise.
In order to measure the time cost of an OD pair, we generate 50 hypothetical target arrival times
from a uniform distribution between 6:00AM and 12:00 midnight. This reflects the fact that Shinkansen
provides HSR service for inter-city travel that do not exhibit obvious peak hours, and also that by
regulation the operation of Shinkansen is restricted from 6:00AM up to midnight. For each of these 50
target arrival times a train that minimizes the user cost is picked, and both time and monetary costs
are recorded for all OD pairs. We assume that late arrivals are not allowed.8 Then the average of
these time values is computed to yield the in-vehicle time and schedule-delay data for each OD pair.
This procedure is repeated for three years, 1986, 1996 and 2006.
Table 3 summarizes the data. Table 4 presents the balance checks of baseline characteristics between
OD pairs in monopoly and duopoly areas.
3 Eﬀects of Railway Market Competition on HSR
Table 5 shows the average travel time of OD pairs in each area, as well as their diﬀerences and changes.
Columns (i) and (ii) show the data of the OD pairs in monopoly and duopoly areas respectively. Column
(iii) gives the diﬀerence between the two, i.e., duopoly minus monopoly. Panel 1 gives the average
8We drop the target arrival time when it is not possible to leave on the same day as the target arrival time is early
in the morning.
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Table 4: Balancing test of baseline characteristics
(2)-(4)
Obs.
Mean
(Std.Dev.)
Obs.
Mean
(Std.Dev.)
Diff.
[Std.Err.]
Time cost per distance (min./km.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time spent in-vehicle / dist. 56 0.484 18 0.493 -0.009
(0.116) (0.089) [0.030]
Schedule delay / dist. 56 0.145 18 0.183 -0.038
(0.140) (0.122) [0.037]
Total time cost / dist. 56 0.629 18 0.675 -0.046
(0.186) (0.186) [0.050]
Notes:  Standard deviations and standard errors are given in parentheses and square brackets, respectively.
Control (monopoly) Treatment (duopoly)
Table 5: Average travel time before and after the privatization of JNR and their diﬀerences.
OD pairs by Area
Monopoly Duopoly Diﬀerence, Duopoly-Monopoly
(i) (ii) (iii)
1. Values in the base year
Average travel time in 1986 79.81 44.72 -35.09***
(38.16) (14.64) [6.15]
2. Values in 1996 in comparison to the base year
Average travel time in 1996 86.86 41.77 -45.09***
(43.49) (13.77) [6.66]
Average change: 1986-1996 7.06 -2.95 -10.01***
(6.48) (2.85) [1.09]
3. Values in 2006 in comparison to the base year
Average travel time in 2006 81.85 39.12 -42.73***
(41.83) (13.98) [6.49]
Average change: 1986-2006 2.04 -5.60 -7.64***
(5.49) (3.09) [1.03]
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parenthesis. Robust standard errors are in square brackets.
The sample consists of 56 OD pairs in monopoly area and 18 OD pairs in duopoly area for each of
years 1986, 1996, and 2006. All values are measured in minutes. Significance at 0.1% is indicated by
***; 1% is by **; 5% is by *; and 10% is by +.
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Table 6: Reduced form regressions for natural log of time costs.
(a) 1996 as treatment year (b) 2006 as treatment year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Duopoly dummy -0.138*** -0.147*** 0.155 -0.150*** -0.207** 1.755***
(0.018) (0.036) (0.504) (0.026) (0.069) (0.468)
Distance×Duopoly dummy 0.015 -2.281 0.089 -14.89***
(0.044) (4.327) (0.078) (4.108)
Distance2×Duopoly dummy 5.830 37.37**
(12.51) (11.78)
Distance3×Duopoly dummy -6.128 -37.85**
(14.59) (13.51)
Distance4×Duopoly dummy 2.287 13.47*
(5.868) (5.344)
Adj. R2 0.971 0.970 0.970 0.899 0.901 0.918
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. The sample consists of 148 observations, and
the base year is 1986 for both treatment years of 1996 and 2006. Distance is measured in 100
kilometers. All models include year and OD fixed eﬀects. Significance at 0.1% is indicated by ***;
1% is by **; and 5% is by *.
travel time in monopoly and duopoly areas and their diﬀerences before the privatization of JNR in
1986. Panel 2 gives the average travel time in 1996 for both areas and their diﬀerence, as well as their
changes between 1986 and 1996. Panel 3 gives those in 2006 as well as their changes between 1986 and
2006.
Average travel time is relatively longer in the monopoly area than in the duopoly area due to the
longer average distance as shown in Table 2. The change in the travel time is also larger for the OD
pairs in monopoly area. The average treatment eﬀect of duopoly on travel time reduction since 1986
measured as the diﬀerence in diﬀerences is about 10 minutes in 1996, and 7.6 minutes in 2006.
In order to account for the diﬀerence in distance of OD pairs in two areas, in the next section we
analyze the the reduced form models. In our estimation we take natural logarithm of the travel time.
We regress this log of travel time against Duopoly dummy and its interaction terms with polynomials
of distance, along with year and OD fixed eﬀects. We look for a heterogeneous impact of market
competition with respect to distance, as conventional rail is a closer substitute for those OD pairs
with shorter distances. It is thus expected that the eﬀect of market competition is augmented in these
short-distance markets. Besides, scatter plot of the travel time over distance shows their relation has
two humps. Given this, polynomials of distance up to the forth order are incorporated in the form of
cross terms to the duopoly dummy.
Table 6 presents the reduced form regression results. Among them, the results in columns (1) and
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Notes: Dotted line shows the 95% confidence interval of the treatment effect at each distance. Values are computed based on 
the estimates of the model with interaction terms of duopoly dummy and forth-order polynomials of distance.
Figure 2. Treatment eﬀects as the change in log of time costs by OD distance.
(4) show that the travel time became significantly lower by about 14% by 1996 and 15% by 2006
in those segments in duopoly area where HSR is competing with conventional rail, relative to those
segments in monopoly area. This tells us that the bullet train slowed down significantly in monopoly
area, relative to duopoly area, after the privatization.
Interaction terms of the duopoly dummy with polynomials of distance seems to be insignificant
for the treatment year of 1996 as shown in Panel 1. However, by looking at each distance, treatment
eﬀect is significant over the range of relevant OD distances in duopoly area. Figure 2 presents the
treatment eﬀect as the change in log of travel time by relevant OD distance in duopoly area, based
on the estimates of the interaction terms of the duopoly dummy and the forth order polynomials of
distance in Column (5) of Table 6. The figure shows that the treatment eﬀect is significant for the
period of 1986 to 1996 over the distance between 20 to 100 km, which is the range of OD distance in
duopoly areas. The eﬀect in the duopoly area is about 10% reduction in travel time, and it is consistent
over the range of distance. For the longer period of 1986 to 2006, treatment eﬀect is more prominent
in shorter distances of 30 to 50 km. The magnitude of travel time reduction in duopoly area is larger
and is over 20% for these distances. This indicates that the competition against the conventional rail
is more intense in these markets.
4 Conclusion
This paper investigated the impact of market competition on the service quality of intercity high-speed
rail (HSR) transport by an oligopolistic service provider. When Japan National Railways (JNR) was
privatized into six regionally monopolistic railway corporations in 1987, there emerged areas where the
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industrial structure of railway transportation happened to be duopolistic due to an operational reason.
Leveraging on this natural experimental setting arising from the privatization of JNR, we conducted
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis to estimate whether the change in speed and scheduling of HSR has
made users worse oﬀ in the segment where railway service provision is monopolized, relative to other
segments where HSR and conventional rail are competing each other, after the privatization of Japan
National Railways. The paper showed that the change in time cost is significantly lower in those
segments where HSR is competing with conventional rail, and that such eﬀect is larger for the trip
distance of 30 to 40km where the competition is presumably more intensive.
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Appendix: Market Structure and Travel Time of Parallel Rail-
ways
We here illustrate a situation where monopoly increases the users’ time cost under a plausible setting.
Let us suppose there are two types of train services in parallel denoted by i = 1, 2. Demand of type i
train service is a function of its own price as well as that of another:
Qi = Qi (Pi, Pj)
for i ̸= j ∈ {1, 2}, where Qi is the demand and Pi is the price of the type i train. Here, Qii =
∂Qi/∂Pi < 0 and since railways are substitutive Qij = ∂Qi/∂Pj > 0. For simplicity we assume
Qiij = 0. Price is consisted of two parts, namely, ticket price say fi and user’s time cost ti hence
Pi = fi + ti
for i = 1, 2. Time cost ti of the type i train determines the amount of required investment Ki (ti). We
assume Ki > 0, K ′i < 0 and K ′′i is positive and monotonic.
Duopoly owns either type while monopoly owns both types of train services. Then duopolist’s
problem is to maximize its profit with respect to ticket price fi and time cost ti which can be written
as
max
fi,ti
πi = fiQi (Pi, Pj)−Ki (ti)
s.t. Pi = ti + fi
given Pj for i ̸= j ∈ {1, 2}. The first-order conditions are
Qi + fiQii = 0
fiQii −K ′i (ti) = 0
where we define Qii = ∂Qi/∂Pi < 0. Let tDi and fDi be the solution to the above, and let PDi = tDi +fDi .
Monopolist’s problem in turn becomes
max
f1,f2,t1,t2
π1 + π2
13
and the corresponding first-order conditions are
Qi + fiQii + fjQji = 0
fiQii + fjQji −K ′i (ti) = 0
for i ̸= j ∈ {1, 2}. Let tMi and fMi be the solution to the above, and let PMi = tMi + fMi . We can
rewrite these first-order conditions by using a parameter δ ∈ {0, 1}:
Qi = −K ′i (ti)
fiD
i
i + δfjD
j
i = K
′
i (ti) (1)
as δ = 0 corresponds to duopoly and δ = 1 to monopoly.
Travel time under price regulation
Suppose for now that the fare is eﬀectively restricted as in our context. Then duopolist’s profit-
maximization problem becomes
max
ti
πi = fiQi (Pi, Pj)−Ki (ti)
s.t. Pi = ti + fi
which further yields the first-order condition as
fiQii = K
′
i
(
tDi
)
for i = 1, 2. We assume that the second-oder condition is globally satisfied implying that fiQiii < K ′′i .9
In turn, monopolist’s problem is now simply
max
t1,t2
π1 + π2
and the corresponding first-order conditions are
fiQii + fjQji = K
′
i
(
tMi
)
9Here we denote by Qiii = ∂Qii/∂ti.
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for i ̸= j ∈ {1, 2}. The fact that fjQji > 0 and fiQiii < K ′′i , along with K ′i < 0 yields that tM > tD.
A case of symmetric parallel railways
Here, we consider a situation where both price and the speed of railways –i.e. the time cost– are
endogenously determined. For analytical tractability we specify the demand and investment functions
assuming symmetry between the two parallel railways as follows:
Qi = a0 − a1Pi + a2Pj
Ki = k0 − k1ti + 1
2
k2t
2
i
for i ̸= j ∈ {1, 2}, with all parameters being positive, and a1 > a2. Then the first order conditions (1)
imply
a0 + (a2 − a1) (t+ f) = k1 − k2t
(a1 − δa2) f = k1 − k2t
where, by symmetry we let t = ti and f = fi for both i = 1, 2. Solving these gives the time cost t as a
continuous function of δ
t (δ) =
(k1 − a0) (a1 − δa2) + (a1 − a2) k1
(k2 − a1 + a2) (a1 − δa2) + (a1 − a2) k2 .
This generates tM = t (1) and tD = t (0) and hence
tM − tD = t (1)− t (0) .
Using continuity of t (δ) with respect to δ rewrites the above as
tM − tD =
∫ 1
0
t′ (δ) dδ
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where
t′ (δ) = [a2 (a1 − a2) (a0k2 − (a1 − a2) k1)] g−2
and g = (k2 − a1 + a2) (a1 − δa2) + (a1 − a2) k2. Now, K ′i (ti) < 0 implies t < k1/k2 which further
implies that
a0k2 − (a1 − a2) k1 > 0
This, together with a1 > a2 > 0, yields that tM > tD.
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